INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY – DEFENCE AND SECURITY

News: 25th anniversary of Pokhran-II: India’s journey to become a nuclear power

 

What's in the news?

       On this day 25 years ago, then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced that India had conducted three nuclear tests at Pokhran.

 

Pokhran Nuclear Test:

Pokhran 1:

       Pokhran-I was India's first nuclear bomb test conducted on May 18, 1974, at the Pokhran Test Range in Rajasthan.

       It was code-named Smiling Buddha and officially described as a "peaceful nuclear explosion" with “few military implications”.

       India became the 6th country in the world to possess nuclear weapons capability after the US, Soviet Union, Britain, France and China.

 

Pokhran 2:

       Pokhran-II refers to a sequence of five nuclear bomb test explosions conducted by India on between 11-13th May 1998 at Rajasthan's Pokhran desert.

       Code name - Operation Shakti, this event marked India's 2nd successful attempt.

 

Significance:

       Pokhran-II cemented India's status as a nuclear power.

       It demonstrated India's ability to possess and deploy nuclear weapons, thus enhancing its deterrence capabilities.

       The Indian government led by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee officially declared itself as a state possessing nuclear weapons following Pokhran-II.

 

India's stand in various treaties related to nuclear weapons:

1. Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 1968:

       India is not a signatory - it declined to accede to the NPT, citing concerns about the treaty's perceived discriminatory nature and lack of reciprocal obligations from nuclear weapons states.

2. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT):

       India has not signed the CTBT as it is a strong advocate for a time-bound disarmament commitment from nuclear weapon states (NWS) and may use the lack of a commitment as a reason to refrain from signing the CTBT.

3. Nuclear Weapons Bans Treaty:

       It is the first treaty of its kind against nuclear armament. This treaty looks at prohibiting the use of atomic weapons, aiming to eliminate them.

       It entered into force on 22 January 2021 and India is not a member of this treaty.

4. Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG):

       It is a group of nuclear supplier countries that seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of two sets of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports.

       India is not a member of the NSG.

 

5. Wassenaar Arrangement:

       It is a voluntary export control regime.

       India joined the arrangement in December 2017 as its 42nd participating state.


India's Nuclear doctrine:

1. No First Use (NFU):

       India committed to not being the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict but would retaliate if attacked with such weapons. 

2. Credible Minimum Deterrence:

       India would maintain a sufficient number of nuclear weapons to deter a nuclear attack, but it would not seek to match other countries’ arsenals in size. 

3. Non-use Against Non-Nuclear Weapon States:

       India would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against countries that do not possess them. 

4. Retaliation to a Nuclear Attack:

       If India is subject to a nuclear attack, it would retaliate, causing massive damage to the aggressor. 

 

Evolution of India's Nuclear Doctrine:

       Origin: The first nuclear test in 1974 was termed as ' peaceful nuclear explosion' by India.

       Nuclear Doctrine 1999: After the second nuclear test in 1998, India's national security advisory board had released India's nuclear framework. It emphasised the ' No first use ' policy.

       Official Nuclear Doctrine 2003: In 2003 Indian government officially  reasserted ' No first use ' policy and also emphasised ' Credible minimum deterrence ' policy. India also stated that it would not use nuclear weapons against non nuclear states.

 

Advantages of India's No First Use policy:

1. Credibility and Clarity:

       India’s nuclear doctrine provides a clear and credible stance on the country’s position regarding the use of nuclear weapons.

       The “No First Use” policy clearly signals that India views nuclear weapons primarily as a deterrent and not as an offensive tool, which contributes to regional stability. 

2. Control of civilian leadership:

       Hair-trigger alert, to ensure that the other side does not get a chance to strike first, does not have to be maintained and so forces and equipment can be in a relaxed posture.

       Nuclear forces can be maintained in a de-mated condition waiting for orders from higher echelons to go to a higher alert status, thus ensuring that command and control stays firmly with the civilian political leadership.

3. Help India to become a member in NSG:

       Strict adherence to the doctrine can strengthen India’s efforts to gain membership in the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) and United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

4. Supports Disarmament Goals:

       The “Credible Minimum Deterrence” stance aligns India with global disarmament goals and reduces the chances of a costly arms race. 

5. Reinforces India’s Responsible Image:

       The doctrine’s principles, especially the “No First Use” policy and “Non-use Against Non-Nuclear Weapon States”, reinforce India’s image as a responsible nuclear power.

       This has strategic benefits for India in terms of its international standing and relations with other countries. 

6. Mitigates the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War:

       The doctrine’s “No First Use” policy reduces the risk of an accidental nuclear war, as it removes the pressure for a rapid decision to launch in a crisis. This allows for a more measured response, potentially averting catastrophe. 

7. Achieve other Economic targets:

       A No First Use doctrine is cheaper to implement; for India, which has many economic targets to achieve, this is a very important factor.

 

Challenges against the No First Use policy:

1. Changing Regional Nuclear Dynamics:

       India’s nuclear doctrine is being tested by the rapidly changing security dynamics in its region.

       The modernization and expansion of China’s nuclear capabilities pose a significant challenge to India’s policy of minimum deterrence.

       This transformation in the nuclear landscape could potentially strain India’s ability to respond effectively in a crisis. 

2. Vulnerability to First Strike:

       The “No First Use” policy potentially exposes India to a damaging first strike from an adversary.

       Critics argue that in such a case, India’s ability to launch a retaliatory strike could be significantly compromised. 

3. Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapons:

       In India the NFU policy has been called into question on the grounds that it allows Pakistan to take the initiative while restricting India’s options militarily and puts India in a disadvantageous position.

       Pakistan’s low nuclear thresholds and its policy of using its nuclear umbrella to foment sub-conventional conflict in India is the principal reason behind the debate around India’s ‘no first use’ policy.

       Nuclear weapons are often seen as an antidote to conventional inferiority as the inferior party will seek to deter conventional attack by threatening a nuclear response.

 

Implications of abandoning No First Use policy:

1. Reduces India's credibility:

       Withdrawing the NFU policy and making a declaration to that effect can affect India’s status as a responsible nuclear power.

2. Nuclear arms race:

       Withdrawing from the No First Use policy will increase the arms race particularly nuclear arms race between India and China which affects both the countries economically.

3. Affect regional peace and stability:

       India's withdrawal from No First Use policy will seriously affect the regional stability and peace among the neighbouring non nuclear countries also.

4. Hindrance to the Nuclear Supply Group membership:

       India is trying to join the elite Nuclear Supply Group.

       India's withdrawal from No First Use policy will exacerbate the hindrance of India's membership in the NSG group.

 

WAY FORWARD:

1. Maintain Strategic Restraint:

       India should continue to adhere to its current nuclear doctrine of “No First Use” and “Credible Minimum Deterrence”.

       These policies have served India well by maintaining regional stability and preserving its international reputation as a responsible nuclear state. 

2. Invest in Missile Defence Systems:

       To counter the growing threat from China’s modernising nuclear arsenal, India should invest in developing and deploying advanced missile defence systems.

       This could offer an additional layer of protection against potential nuclear strikes. 

3. Regular dialogues with regional nuclear states:

       India should engage in regular strategic dialogues with its nuclear-armed neighbours, China and Pakistan.

       This can help in managing mutual concerns, reducing misunderstandings, and preventing potential conflicts. 

4. Promote Nuclear Disarmament:

       India should continue advocating for global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. This includes supporting international treaties aimed at nuclear disarmament and urging other nuclear states to adopt “No First Use” policies. 

 

The NFU policy is just right for India as it ensures security for the nation and does not detract it from its march towards better prosperity for its people.